ASIAN AFFAIRS INTERVIEW WITH S. JAYAKUMAR Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore THE ASEAN SYSTEM Serge Berthier.- What is the ASEAN way of working? What would be its pre-occupation if it were a western organisation, for example, the EU? S. Jayakumar.- Well to the extent that I know EU, and I don’t claim to know it very well, I think there’s one important difference. It is in the nature of the integration. In the EU, there is, in economic matters and even parliamentary matters, a certain surrender of sovereignty in some areas of competence. So, in that sense, the EU integration is markedly different from what ASEAN has done. From that, probably flows some methods of procedure and methods of decision-making, which may be the reason why it is not the same in ASEAN. S.B.- It took more than thirty years for Europe to evolve towards an integrated body. Will ASEAN ever be an integrated body? S.J.- Whether it will ever happen in the future, we do not know. But for ASEAN, we never conceived of ourselves, from the beginning and even now, as an integration as in the sense of roles. S.B.- Then what is its purpose? S.J.- Its aim is more cooperation and consensus building to the extent that is possible, in political dialogue such as responses to external environment and in economic cooperation, for instance AFTA (1). But there has not been, and I don’t think there is now, any extent of surrendering sovereignty. So, the key is, small little Singapore and huge Indonesia have the same kind of voice in ASEAN. It is in itself quite a remarkable achievement. S.B.- Why? S.J.- ASEAN is a very heterogeneous body. Take, for example, our systems of government. Singapore and Malaysia are influenced by the British system. Vietnam is ruled by a communist party. Brunei has got its own unique system of government with his Majesty the Sultan, the Philippines influenced by a little bit of a American system and in Thailand, you have an elected government under a constitutional monarch. This is one of the reasons why our European friends sometimes do not understand ASEAN. S.B.- What do you mean? S.J.- I will take a recent example. I had hosted the ASEAN-EU dialogue in Singapore (2). Some of my European colleagues and Foreign ministers asked me, “Why is it when talking about Myanmar, why is it that you can’t exercise leverage because in Europe, when you admit a new member we say these are the conditions you must subscribe to, e.g. European conventions, the human rights, you must have free elections, you must have this system of government and so on. Why don’t you do the same and exercise leverage?" They do not understand that we have for many years paid a lot of importance to the element that we are not homogeneous. S.B.- What you mean is that ASEAN has to face the fact that the countries that we have in South-East Asian nations have very little in common. S.J.- It is a fact to reckon with. This is precisely why we have attached importance to the obvious. Yet different though we may be at different stages of economic development, cultural and political background, we have been able to be together. So if you ask me what is the unique ASEAN way, I think the ASEAN way is: Different though we are, let’s try to strike a common consensus. The achievement of ASEAN and the way of ASEAN is that despite differences we have been able to reach the core of quite a number of things. This, putting it, very generally, is how ASEAN has worked for 30 years. One could have predicted that the differences would tear the organisation apart. There were many critics and commentators in the 1960s, when ASEAN was formed, who said it was not possible for this grouping to last. S.B.- Why? After all, in Europe, historical differences. are part of the background. S.J.- The scale is different. In Asia, you could argue that there were so many religions, so many races. How can they succeed? S.B.- Has ASEAN achieved its aim? S.J.- I think we are still an organisation in the making. S.B.- That ASEAN has survived and went from five members to nine today is in itself a success, but is that enough to make it a successful organisation? S.J.- You can look at it a different way. At the beginning, ASEAN was trying to achieve consensus on very few issues in the basket of items. While enlarging the diversity with new members joining the organization, we have been able simultaneously to have a larger and larger basket where we have a common consensus. S.B.- In the basket of items, you have now, with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the security issues. It was indeed completely out of the question to discuss such matters earlier on. It is a new step for ASEAN and it is a big step, but do you see the same process involving the one that you had for economic and political concerns, going on for the ARF in the future? S.J.- To describe ARF, I’ll start off first by saying what ASEAN is not. ASEAN is not a major power bloc of a major power unto itself. We will be deluding ourselves if we say: "With six, seven, nine countries, we are a major force to be reckoned with”. I would not say that. Where ASEAN can be useful to itself as well as be a useful player on the international or regional scene, is to be a catalyst and to be a facilitator of instruments for dialogue in regional issues. This is the SingaporIan way of looking at it. S.B.- So, where does ARF fit in? S.J.- In the security scene in Asia, ASEAN should engage some of the key players. Therefore, how do we engage them? Before the ARF was established, ASEAN countries had their own dialogue partners, the United States, Russia, Japan and a few others; each ASEAN member talking to each of them separately. How the idea of ARF came about was that some of us felt that with the changing of the geopolitical scene and a very fluid situation in East Asia, we need to engage the key players in a forum where we discuss security issues. S.B. Separately? S.J.- No, to engage all of them at the same time, within the same instrument. The key player of course was first what we referred to as the triangular relationship - Japan, China, the United States, then other players. And what we did was to involve all the key dialogue players and the observers countries. That was the main criteria. Full dialogue partners, observers countries and ASEAN countries were what we envisaged as the composition for such a forum. S.B.- Is it then an Asian NATO in the making? S.J.- No. Unlike NATO or others organizations, the difference between ARF and other previous instruments is that it was not born out of a conflict situation; it is not after a war, it is not in response to a perceived enemy and it is not out of a treaty arrangement. So that was an advantage. S.B.- In what respect? S.J.- It allows for a very loose arrangement. The way I see it, I am not sure if my ASEAN colleagues would agree, ARF is a facilitator that allows ASEAN to engage other parties. S.B.- The Cold War is over. So is it so important in Asia to engage other parties? S.J.- We think it is important to engage the United States. Furthermore, prior to that, there were very few forums where China, United States and Japan could sit down and discuss. S.B.- ARF is new. How is it going to evolve? S.J.- We see the long-term future of the ARF in three stages. First, confidence building measures. Next, preventive diplomacy measures and finally we hope it would have the capacity for conflict resolution. S.B.- So, it is at stage one… S.J.- I would say the first stage has taken off, the confidence building measures. I think it should move fairly soon to elements of the next stage which is preventive diplomacy. If it moves to the other stage and how fast it moves depends on the comfort level of the key participants. S.B.- But to a lay man like me, all this sounds a bit like diplomatic gibberish… S.J.- In the beginning, naturally there were some who wondered, “What’s this all about?” As we got on, we involved each country, and one or two paired on a specific item, like the United States and Singapore paired on “search and rescue”, China and the Philippines were paired on proposals of confidence building measures. S.B.- So, what is the outcome of all this sitting down and talking? S.J.- This process of sitting down, talking, has raised the comfort level and it is quite interesting because the setting is quite important. It is just one minister plus one. No huge retinue of officials. But I notice that after three ARF meetings, and especially with the third one, there is an even higher comfort level. People refer to each other by first names. The comfort level is increasing and has increased to the extent that at the last ARF a very important move was made, that is, to increase one plus two. In other words now, there is one minister plus two other officials. Previously, it was one minister plus one. S.B.- From the military, I presume, since we are talking security issues. S.J.- No. That is the point. Usually, it was the foreign ministry official. Some of us proposed that it is meaningless to have an ARF without defense officials. So without prescribing that the second official must be a defense official, all the ARF members agreed that now we can have one plus two and we leave it to the countries to decide. For many of us, the second one is a defense official. So after three ARF, we have moved into that. I should say that it is not a bad indicator of the comfort level. S.B.- That sort of approach may be typical of Asia, but it must be completely new for partners like the United States or some observers coming from Europe, because that’s not really the way we are used to in these sort of matters. But then does it come to some sort of agreement on one thing or another? S.J.- At the end of an ARF session, there’s no negotiated agreement. We leave it to the Chairman to issue a Chairman’s statement, as he feels. Of course, he would have his quiet consultations but we do not spend too much time going into the wee hours of the morning, drafting and hammering out negotiations. S.B.- And the Chairman, chief of the ARF, is organized by rotation in the same way of ASEAN? S.J.- Well, what is interesting, thus far, the ARF is always back-to-back with an ASEAN ministerial meeting. So, the Chair has always been an ASEAN country. Now you have to ask our non-ASEAN friends whether they are happy with it. But my own feeling is that some of the bigger powers, and I will not mention who, are more comfortable with ARF so long as it’s chaired by an ASEAN country. S.B.- I can understand why. In a way, it down-grades the larger issue… S.J.- Well, let’s not say “down-grade” but I think the degree of strategic vested interests of an ASEAN members is less high-profile than may be if it was chaired by a country outside ASEAN such as Japan. S.B.- It was mentioned that ASEAN is the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the members. What did you mean by this? I will take the example of the basket you mentioned earlier. Is it that the comfortable way for everyone in ASEAN and the way of working is such that you find that your foreign policy has now a commonality that allows you to think that the ASEAN way is actually a reflection of each member’s interest? S.J.- Well, by that I mean several things. One is that ASEAN cooperation and ASEAN interest figure highly. Of course for every country, as elsewhere, natural interests are the main guide for foreign policies. But I think for ASEAN countries, the ASEAN interest and the need to maintain ASEAN cooperation has always been an important factor in a country foreign’s policy. I will just cite two examples. Even when countries have had a delicate period in bilateral relationships, it has not impeded ASEAN cooperation. You know that in 1997 we have had periods where relations with Malaysia were a bit strained. But it never affected my working with the Foreign Minister of Malaysia and officials working with Malaysia in an ASEAN context. Some years ago, we had a little problem with the Philippines over a maid who was executed for murder. Emotions were riding high in the Philippines. At the height of that difficult period, we had here in Singapore, an ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting which amongst other things discussed the South China Sea’s problems. The Philippines had a proposal for a declaration, to be endorsed by the Ministers. My Permanent Secretary came to me and said that this was the proposal to be faxed to other ministers, and I said to proceed. By telephone and fax, we had an ASEAN meeting which produced a declaration of statement, in Singapore, on the South China Sea. The originator of the proposal was the Philippines and we supported it. S.B.- So, in ASEAN, you not only pay attention to the non-interference principle in the internal affairs of a member, but you avoid bringing the bilateral relations of the members into the picture. S.J.- It is one of our strengths. We, ASEAN countries, have not brought into ASEAN the bilateral problems of the country to discuss it in its jurisdiction. Sometimes, we managed to put our bilateral problems on the back burner, so to speak. S.B.- Are there many such bilateral problems? S.J.- There are some. Two examples: Singapore has a territorial dispute with Malaysia. Singapore and Malaysia have disagreed. They say it theirs. We say it is ours. We could not convince each other of our legal arguments. We said, “Okay, let’s send it to the International Court of Justice”. So the officials are working out a special agreement. Indonesia and Malaysia also have had some disputes over some islands and they too had sent it to the international court. S.B.- Now, I would like to come to the question of the United Nations Security Council. Looking at the communique of the first ASEM (3), it was a very clearly detailed communique on the fact, that, inter alia, reform of the security council was something that ASEM will push forward. We all know that it’s a difficult problem and now we had this last ASEAN meeting with the Japan agreement that reiterated the Security Council reform and so on. Where does ASEAN stand on that? S.J.- ASEAN has no common position. S.B.- ASEAN has not made up his mind or has not worked on it? S.J.- I am afraid, both S.B.- It is a bit surprising because it is a major issue. S.J.- It is because, I think, when you know from the beginning that each of us has a different nuance, we don't push and force a convergence when clearly the positions are different. S.B.- But how can the question be avoided? After all, we all know that this organisation needs to be changed. S.J.- Everybody wants to improve the UN. It’s like a motherhood statement. I think when you see the agenda item “strengthen UN under ASEM”, these were some of the topics which we had as indicative lists for political discussions. One is on the exchange of views on UN. But, quite frankly, at the first ASEM, there were no in-depth discussions on that. Since then, at the foreign ministers level here, there were no in-depth discussions because they were more interested in the other things in the ASEM Foreign Minister Meeting. My own guess is that you can have an exchange of views among the countries but it will not be ASEAN telling the Asian members of ASEM to say, “Look, European counterparts, these are our views.” You know Singapore’s position. We have been a bit naughty! We have posed some difficult questions in our speech to the United Nations because we thought that the debate in the UN has an air of unreality (4). Everybody is talking about it but nobody wants to ask the difficult question of whether “the emperor has got any clothes”. So we were naughty boys. S.B.- I agree with you that the UN debates have most of the time, not adding anything, an air of unreality. But what is the crux of this unreality? S.J.- Everybody is saying, "Let’s have two, three permanent members,” but nobody has answered the stark question, “Do you mean new permanent members with the veto?”. Then people start fudging the question. But that’s part and parcel of the whole issue. They are skirting it, saying: "Well, we can decide on the veto later.” But our view is no, you can't. When you say permanent members, let’s be clear what is the concept of permanent members because it already has a connotation of rights and one of the rights a permanent members has, is the veto. And we need to know if you are going to enlarge it by two, three, four, would it be exactly the same? And even for the United States’s position, there is a studied ambiguity. S.B.- So, it means that basically there was no common position in Asia and no common position in Europe, there is no common position elsewhere either. We know it is a long-term discussion but right now is it moving at all? S.J.- I am not very optimistic about these reforms, in so far as it affects the Security Council expansion. I think we can do other things in the meantime. It would be better to focus on the working system first. We should de-link reform from the expansion of the Security Council. S.B.- I think I agree with you that maybe we should split the problem and start with the easy part before moving to more difficult issues. Is ASEAN at least of the same view that we should start with cleaning the house before we start rebuilding the wall? S.J.- Well, I think if you ask them, there may be some dealings. Does it mean that until and unless you expand the Security Council there should be no reform? Having this linkage is not too productive. S.B.- Now, we come to the question of the relations between ASEAN and China. In December there was a first, with the meeting in Kuala-Lumpur of the leaders of Asia, that is the leaders of ASEAN plus the leaders of China, Japan and Korea. I was struck by the fact that in the joint-communique with China, there is this reference to the interest in promoting peace and stability and building confidence and so on, whereas in the other communiques, with Japan and Korea, you don't find this sort of reference. Why single out that sort of promotion for China, and not mention this for the others? S.J.- Well, I do not know the genesis of the communique. This was worked out by officials and went through several stages but first what is important is that such a communique was agreed. But having said that, and not knowing the details of how it evolved, speaking as Singapore Foreign Minister, I would say that for ASEAN countries, South East Asian countries, the challenge for the next 10 to 15 years is to engage China. China is going to become a major power. It will become a big economic power. With its economic power, so too, it will develop its other attributes of a big power. It is no secret that some of the South-East Asian countries asked, “What will be the attitude of a powerful China towards South-East Asian countries?’ It is a natural question to ask and particularly with regard to some of the disputes and territorial claims. This is what triggers the question in fact. So rather than wait for China to be a power in years to come, it’s good to engage her now in various forms and not just by the ARF. That’s one way of getting them to interact with us, to know our concerns and apprehensions. S.B.- This first meeting of the leaders is therefore a breakthrough into a new era. S.J.- We already had an ASEAN-China dialogue at Foreign Ministers’ level. However this is a new forum, at the highest level. It is a new stage, a new instrument. S.B.- Could you comment on the relation between ASEAN and China at this moment? S.J.- We want China to succeed. It will be good for the region. But if there are problems, there must be amicable ways or peaceful ways of resolving problems. S.B.- Is there some concern presently? S.J.- Singapore is not a claimant state in the South China territory. We have two concerns. Because we are in the region, our concern shared by others, is that the way in which the competing claimants resolve their disputes should be by peaceful methods so as not to have tensions or worse, conflict. Some years ago there was cause for concern where some gunboats had eyeball-to-eyeball diplomacy. That’s not good. The second concern for us in Singapore is because we are so dependent on navigational routes (5) We have a concern with the rest of the world in ensuring that freedom of navigation in established route are not in any way jeopardized. In other words, whether it’s Vietnam, China, the Philippines or whoever is finally judged to be the rightful owner, we expect them to observe the International Law of the Sea in respecting international shipping rights. That’s a concern not just for the claimant states but for the entire international community. S.B.- But China has always said that she is going to respect those laws. You just want to force her again and again to say it. S.J.- Yes, China said so but it’s ASEAN countries and countries like Singapore that had to articulate these concerns. And in the process of dialogue the Chinese government has said “yes” and that’s good. So in that sense, the dialogue and the different instruments of dialogue have proved useful. S.B.- ASEAN is at the core of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANFWZ). Now that you have this SEANFWZ, will it be extended? S.J.- I think this is the objective of ASEAN. We cannot talk of a nuclear weapon-free zone without getting the nuclear-weapon countries on board. That is the only way for SEANFWZ to be effective. S.B.- So, is it the case? S.J.- There is a problem because some of the nuclear weapon states have raised objections to some of the provisions such as the definition of the zone, I think, that has some reference to the economic zones and continental shelves. It is a technical and legal point which makes it difficult for them to come on board. I think China, the United States and maybe France have a problem with that. So what ASEAN countries are doing is to make suitable amendments because the issue is really a technical one and I believe that problem is almost resolved. When we have made the amendments, they will be able to sign the protocol to accept the SEANFWZ. Because the priority has been to get the nuclear-weapon states on board first, we have not really discussed the case of Japan. S.B.- With regard to the statement with Korea signed in December 15th 1997, there is an allusion to the armistice agreement. Everyone knows that agreement is still valid, but North Korea repudiated it two years ago. Was the statement an endorsement of the position of South Korea? S.J.- ASEAN is supportive of the efforts to prevent any deterioration of tensions in the region. We wanted to demonstrate that we are concerned by what is going on in the Korean Peninsula. We therefore welcome the four-party talks. But we do not take sides on that position. Most importantly, we must give the signal that we are not solely engrossed with Southeast Asia, and to give the perception that we do not have interest in other problems. Just as we want to engage others in Southeast Asia, we are not indifferent to potential flash-points in the region. Having said that, I must confess that we do not really know what’s going on in North Korea. I asked others to enlighten me, but with no great results. It seems to me quite a mystery what’s happening there. Winter 1998 Notes: 1.- ASEAN Free Trade Area or AFTA was initiated in 1992. It is intended to help preserve ASEAN's competitiveness in the new environment. By the year 2003, tariffs within ASEAN would be reduced to 0-5% on virtually all products. AFTA is progressing on schedule. The new ASEAN members have been given a different timetable to conform to the common tariffs. In addition to tariff reductions, ASEAN has pushed on regional liberalization in trade and services in a Framework Agreement, and is now looking towards creating an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). 2.- The first ASEM Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 15 February 1997. The meeting took place halfway between the inaugural ASEM in Bangkok in March 1996 and ASEM II which is scheduled for 1998 in the United Kingdom. The meeting was attended by Foreign Ministers from the 10 Asian nations, the 15 European nations and the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission. One of the highlights of the ASEM Foreign Ministers' meeting was the launch of the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). 3.- The inaugural Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was held in Bangkok on 1-2 March 1996 and attended by the Heads of State and Government from 10 Asian nations and 15 European nations and the President of the European Commission. The Meeting regarded the ASEM as a useful process promoting further co-operation between Asia and Europe. The Meeting recognized that the ASEM process needed to be open and evolutionary. The Meeting further agreed that follow-up actions to be undertaken jointly by the participants to the ASEM will be based on consensus. However an ASEM ministerial meeting to be held in Bangkok in 1997 was torpedoed by the insistence of the European countries to exclude the participation of Myanmar. 4.- "The entire Security Council reform process is in danger of being lost in a wilderness of logical contradictions and ambiguities", Singapore Minister for Foreign Affairs Professor S. Jayakumar said in his speech to the 52nd United Nations General Assembly in New York on 29 September 1997. He said that although Singapore agreed that Germany and Japan should be new Permanent Members if eventual agreement was reached on expansion of the Security Council, his concern was that the differential selection process for Japan and Germany and developing countries would be discriminatory. He noted that the expansion of the Security Council to 21 with new Permanent Members from Japan, Germany and three developing countries would mean only one additional non-permanent seat for the remaining 165 members of the UN, all of whom had a right to serve the UN on the Security Council at least occasionally. This was a situation that would be unacceptable to the majority of UN Members. 5.- To alleviate this concern, China has signed on 19 January 1998 a joint-communique with the United States on the matter of navigational rights on international recognized routes and a search and rescue agreement which, for the first time, provide a framework of co-operation between the Chinese Navy and the American Navy.
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