ASIAN AFFAIRS ON TAIWAN Ma Ying Jiu - Mayor of Taipei WHAT'S THE DEAL (with the Mainland)? Serge Berthier (SB).- You were in Hong Kong quite recently on an official visit (1). What do you think of “One Country Two systems” in Hong Kong since 1997 ?\ Ma Ying-jiu (MYJ).- I was actually in Hong Kong in January 1997, six months before the change over, at a time when we were all worried about two things: interference from Beijing first and secondly Hong Kong's prospects for continuing economic growth. Until now, more than three years later, Beijing interference doesn’t seem to be that serious, and Hong Kong continues to grow economically, especially the investments toward Hong Kong and tourism. On the other hand, there are things that Hong Kong people do not see as satisfactory, including, as you know, the issue of immigration. But generally speaking, the “one country two systems” as applied to Hong Kong did better than we expected (2) . On the other hand, we in Taiwan do not consider this formula applicable to Taiwan, because Taiwan is fundamentally different from Hong Kong. SB.- At the eve of the handover, I met Chris Patten, the last governor of Hong Kong. After a long demonstration of goodwill on Hong Kong’s bright future, he asked me just as I was leaving if I would stay or leave after July 1st. When I said that I was going to live in Hong Kong, he looked surprised. That means that in spite of his protestation to the contrary, he did not believe in the future of Hong Kong. MYJ.- That’s interesting but not unique. One of my classmates of college is now a quite well known lawyer in the SAR. If I compare what he told me before and after the handover, it is quite clear that the judicial system has been able to maintain its autonomy and independence. He is basically satisfied and he only hopes that nothing will change later on. But of course, the economic depression causes some worries in the financial and business community. They are quite worried about the depreciation of the real estate. SB.- Some people were guessing what would have been the true impact of the handover on Hong Kong without the financial crisis. We will never know, and that kind of guessing game is useless. Nevertheless, does Taiwan draw a lesson from what happened and the attitude of the Chinese authorities for the past three years towards Hong Kong? MYJ.- As I said Hong Kong and Taiwan have a different background. The people in Taiwan generally believe that we are now a democracy. There is no point where we should negotiate with the Mainland how to run Taiwan while it is an issue in Hong Kong which was a colony. And that is why we do not believe that “one country two systems” should apply to us. Because once we do that, things like our external relations and place in the international community would probably be affected. This issue has, however, to be resolved in the larger context of cross-strait relations. Whether Beijing continues to use “one country two systems” as a formula to resolve the so-called Taiwan question is likely, but they do know that this formula has very limited constituency in Taiwan. Many of us do not consider meaningful to give a serious consideration to a proposal like that. First, people are not so sure about the exact content of that phrasing. The only living example is Hong Kong, but Hong Kong is so different from Taiwan. SB, - Indeed, but can't you consider it as an acknowledgement of difference, as the "one country-two systems" imply, as a process? There is no real definition of “one country two systems”. I remember Lu Ping (3) telling me that when the word was coined, it was more to say: we have a system, they have a system, and it is not the same system, so what about “one country, many systems”? MYJ.- Well, we heard Beijing was ready to put it like “one country, three systems”, and to design a third system just for Taiwan, but a lot of people consider that this way of thinking wouldn’t be very much appreciated here. Now, as a democracy, we have to decide things and policies on a democratic basis. When we are able to elect our president, why should we adopt something like “one country two systems” of which nobody really knows what the content would be (4). SB.- Still, you need a framework, a basis of discussion? MYJ.- The Chinese in Beijing say, it is going to be better than what we offered to Hong Kong, but if so, what’s the deal ? You cannot reasonably rely your faith on a statement like this. So I think it is more practical for the two sides to engage each other on more down to earth issues, like whether we should establish the three links, either before or after both sides’ entry in the WTO. Those issues are more important than the political ones. Even the Chinese authorities do not consider the political ones as a very urgent topic at this moment because it involves much larger questions such as the concept of sovereignty which at the present moment is untouchable. SB,- So you feel they are putting it aside for practical reasons, waiting that you find a way... MYJ.- That’s my hope, because no matter how important is the “one country two systems” for Beijing, this is not going to happen in the near future. SB.- But the Chinese authorities know that as well. MYJ.- Yes and they keep telling you this formula and that formula for political rhetoric purposes. But when you come to concrete issues of cross strait relations, we still have to face very complicated and sometimes highly technical questions. How are we going to go about establishing the three links ? This is not as easy as to make an announcement in the morning and it is done in the afternoon. Flying over is easy but all the institutions, systems, laws, regulations associated with such a single flight would make negotiations as long as two years. SB.- Certainly, but you have to get started somewhere... MYJ.- That’s right. That’s what I keep saying. Eight years ago when I was Senior Vice-Chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) (5), I wrote a paper on the problems and prospects of the direct navigation with Mainland China, and listed all the problems that we would encounter in the future. Those problems remain. We haven’t even started to touch them. That’s why sometimes I become a little bit worried when I hear high level officials talking about opening the so-called “big three links” (6) as if they could do it overnight. That’s impossible; After all, you have two governments, two legal systems. They have their Aviation Department, we have ours. You can’t let one government decide on issues that require joint resolution of two governments. On the other hand, we have to avoid calling the other side government, so you have to have a lot of sensitivity. SB.- Is your feeling that China will be prepared to play the game at some stage and to go after more practical matters, putting aside all the political rhetoric? MYJ.- From now, it would happen only if Taiwan adheres to the “one China principle”. They are very serious on that. No matter how much goodwill President Chen Shui-bian has released in the last year or so, it is not acceptable to them as long as he says nothing about this “one China principle”, instead of, as he does, arguing about it as an issue to be negotiated. In that context, China will continue to “listen to what we say and watching what we do” (tingqiyan, guanqixing), but they are not talking to us, that’s their attitude. Until we openly accept this “one China principle”, they are not going to take any action. SB.- What does the “one China principle” mean in the mind of Taiwanese people? MYJ.- The unfortunate thing is that the two sides were able to reach some consensus in 1992. The consensus at this time was agreeing on the “one China principle”, while disagreeing on the content of it. That was a fragile consensus, but still a consensus. After 1995, and the trip of our former President to Cornell University of the US, Mainland China stopped calling that consensus what it was supposed to be: “one China, with different interpretations”, and then turned to “One China”, full stop, without mention of different interpretations. They feared after the US trip that if “different interpretations” continue to exist in Taiwan, it would become something that could accommodate the independence view. SB.- For the Taiwanese people, was it the case? Was "different interpretations" a cloak masking an independent concept of Taiwan? MYJ.- No, but when aware of the shorten wording of the consensus, the Taiwanese people began to worry and wondered whether “one China” refers exclusively to the People"s Republic of China (that is the Beijing authorities). SB.- But that concern was based on a misunderstanding, for, from many statements we know it is not the case. MYJ.- That is true. That is why earlier this year vice-Premier Qian Qichen told the Washington Post that “one China means Mainland China and Taiwan”. Many people consider such statement a good development and an improvement compared to the position last year. But still, in spite of such a goodwill, since the current President of Taiwan has a long history of supporting the Taiwanese independence, although he vowed not to declare it during his term of office, scepticism remains in the mind of Chinese observers. SB.- You are a KMT member and in the opposition. What is the view of your party today? MYJ.- What we, KMT, as an opposition party, call for is that both sides go back to the 1992 consensus, so that we can start from what has brought us together. We should agree that there is only one China, and that this “one China” deserves different interpretations, or at least promises different interpretations. It has to be so because according to our constitution, there is no way that we could legally recognize the existence of another Chinese entity. The Chinese authorities have the same problem. So, because their constitution and ours could not allow that, let’s forget about it, leave it aside and go to some more urgent problems that need our attention. But the current administration has still some problems with such a view SB.- You mean the current DPP administration, but would the Chinese authorities be prepared to entertain your view? MYJ.- The Mainland authorities say they are willing to go back to 1992, but their version of the 1992 consensus is only “one China”. The extent to which they are willing to make a concession is that "one China" means Mainland and Taiwan. SB.- Which should be good enough, don't you think? MYJ.- Which is good, but not good enough, because the consensus we reached in 1992 was that of “One China with different interpretations”. We already said that such a concept, Mainland and Taiwan, refers only to a geographical reality, something they should have recognized long ago. What we are trying to say is that, between the two sides of the Taiwan strait, there is the People’s Republic of China, and there is the Republic of China. Each side has its own constitution. SB.- But then, we come to a sticking point. The Chinese authorities are not prepared to discuss on the base of a state-to-state relationship. They consider Taiwan a domestic issue and the Taiwanese authorities equivalent to provincial authorities. MYJ.- In relation to the Mainland, we could decide not to use a state-to-state relationship, but treat it as a special relation. That is possible because our constitution has been revised to allow that. I was one of the drafters of the constitutional amendments. But they do not seem to appreciate that very much. They believe that they are the big brother. To recognise that one China means Mainland and Taiwan is the only concession they are prepared to make. SB.- Why can't the Chinese authorities go back to a consensus that was reached many years ago? What should happen for them to go back to it? MYJ.- At the moment it is very difficult for them because they fear that Taiwan could take advantage of the so-called “different interpretations” for other purposes. SB.- It reflects a lack of trust. MYJ.- Yes. SB.- But can they trust Chen Shui-ban who had as a political platform the independence of Taiwan for so long? MYJ.- When I was in Hong Kong I defended President Chen's policy to everybody's surprise. People were surprised because I was the one who ousted him two years ago (as mayor of Taipei). But I was sincere. The President made a very good job in not declaring Taiwan's independence, not revising the constitution in order to accommodate the two-states theory, not holding the plebiscite on unification or independence, and not abolishing the National Unification Council (NUC) (7). If all this had been done by me, a KMT member, it would not have deserved attention because of what we have been saying for years. But it was said by a President who used to support Taiwan’s independence. So President Chen has come a long way. He has to get some credit for that. He also says that before unification, the two sides should have an integration phase of transition, which I consider as another demonstration of goodwill. And I think that Beijing should react positively to what has been said because for the President, to make such a statement, it is a lot of work. Beijing seems to have no trust in him, and because of their own domestic agenda next year (16th Congress) they are afraid that something could escape out of their control at a very bad moment. SB.- You mention the domestic agenda of the Chinese authorities, but there is also the possibility that they are watching the domestic agenda of Taiwan and in particular the next legislative election. That should give an indication of the DPP's strength. MYJ.- I don’t think that the coming elections in Taiwan could bring any change, even if the opposition parties win the majority. The President, unless and until he gets an absolute majority, wouldn’t have the authority to do anything drastic. SB.- But he may try to please the Americans, whatever it means… MYJ.- That is true. SB.- What could happen then if one day he has the power base he needs… MYJ.- That is not very likely. In fact, you may notice that there is no sense of urgency from the part of the Mainland to negotiate with us. SB.- We asked this question many times in Taiwan: who benefits most from the current procrastination on the issue? Most consider it is to Taiwan's benefit to play with time. Our feeling is that it can't be in Taiwan's interest to face a stronger and possibly more assertive China. Most of the people in Taiwan live in a denial situation in which they don’t see China moving faster and faster. MYJ.- That is true. The new government is guided and controlled by ideology (8) and not pragmatic enough. Many officials are not very realistic. Today, without doing anything, Mainland China gets everything it needs or wants from Taiwan, whether it is capital or talents, at no cost. Taiwanese companies are moving to the Mainland without any control or real restrictions. SB.- But to enforce restrictions is certainly no longer workable and beneficial for Taiwan. MYJ.- Of course. What is needed and done by some is an appropriate division of cost and labor. We have many companies who believe in that and share their activities between the two sides on their own initiative. For example, Delta company, a pretty large Taiwanese company in the electronic sector, with sales of about 20 billions USD, has 8 per cent of its operations in the Mainland factories, but the Research & Development are still in Taiwan. The management is very much in line with what Ford, IBM, or Microsoft are doing. For many companies, their overseas market is larger than the domestic one. Whether you like it or not, all the companies are moving to the Mainland without restrictions. SB.- What would you do if you were today in charge again of the relations between the Mainland and Taiwan? MYJ.- When I was in the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), I kept saying that the key component, the key technology should stay in Taiwan. On the other hand, if we were able to trade directly with the Mainland we could also attract many talents to Taiwan. The Mainland is very good in high-tech in some areas. So we have to seize this opportunity to make a two way street. Even today, the Mainland mayors for instance come to Taiwan, and myself I cannot go there. I keep saying at the MAC that time is not on our side! SB.- Hong Kong has recently changed its restrictive immigration law in order to attract talents from Mainland China. This means that the environment is changing quite fast and not necessarily in Taiwan's favor. MYJ.- Yes, we should negotiate quickly on the three links and let Mainland companies enter the Taiwanese market, otherwise it is a one way street. The problem is that our national government believes that time is on our side ! On the other hand, even some foreign experts, for example Japanese economists say that the Mainland is moving so fast that if Taiwan wants to join, it should join now in order to share the benefits, otherwise it will be left behind. SB.- What would break the deadlock and push Taiwan to start negotiating in earnest? MYJ.- I think that there are some steps to be taken: first of all, we should reach an understanding with the other side of returning to the 1992 consensus. The second step is to invite the Chairman of ARATS (9), to come and visit Taiwan and to resume the negotiations. Just on the three links, discussion would, as I said, take at least two years. That would probably take place after the two sides enter the WTO. By the way we do not necessarily have to use the WTO framework to do it, we can just engage each other on a bilateral basis. Once the three links are established, we would gradually adjust our economy and the division of labour. It would not be only in our interest, but also in their interest, so that we could have a normal exchange of goods, services, capitals, and resources, just like everybody else. SB.- Is it conceivable that the DPP being in power or being the leader of a coalition, such a move could or would be done? MYJ.- Well, if the KMT was to return to power, that would probably be easier to achieve. But as we are right now, I can’t say what to do or not to do to the government. What I’m able to do is to facilitate or foster the city-to-city exchanges, especially on trade issues. We have already a twin platform with Hong Kong, and would like to expand it next year into a three-cities platform with Shanghai. Spring 2001 Notes : 1.- His five days visit in Hong Kong in February 2001 was to promote the city-to-city exchange and find a new way of dialogue between the two sides. Ma also made suggestions to the council that it relaxes the restrictions on Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao from entering Taiwan by making procedures for them to obtain Taiwan visas easier. 2.- “One country, two systems” (yiguo liangzhi) has been launched during the third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 1978. The entire formula was “peaceful reunification, one country two systems” (In fact, “yiguo liangzhi” is a contraction of “yi ge guojia, liangzhong zhidu”, the first time the 4 characters formula became officially admitted was in 1984). It has terminated the period in which Chinese officials used the term “liberate Taiwan”. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping himself said that “we cannot use ‘liberation of Taiwan’ any more. We will respect their own system, provided Taiwan comes back to the motherland”. 3.- Lu Ping was the top Mainland official in Hong Kong, the Director of the Chinese State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office during the decade preceding the handover of Hong Kong. He retired in 1998. 4.- In fact, in 1984, the Chairman of the Popular National Assembly, Ye Jianying, gave some specific content to it: “Once Taiwan unified with the motherland, it could become a special administrative region with high autonomy. It could be allowed to maintain its armed forces, and our central government wouldn’t interfere in local affairs. Taiwan current economic, social affairs remaining unchanged, as well as external economic and cultural relations with other countries (...)”. It appears very close to Qian Qichen’s “seven points” clarification on “one country two systems” made in July 2001 in Beijing during a visit of a Taiwanese New Party delegation, shown as below: 1 continue using its own currency; 2 maintain its status as a separate Customs territory; 3 preserve its governmental structure; 4 and armed forces. And said: 5 that public monies from Taiwan would remain on the island; 6 that Beijing would guarantee private property rights; 7 that Beijing grants Taiwan full autonomy for all of its political appointments. 5.- The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) was setup in 1991. It is responsible for overall research, planning, review and coordination of Mainland policy and affairs, as well as the implementation of specific inter-ministerial programs. MAC reports to the Legislative Yuan as mandated in the Constitution. The President, however, and the National Security Council (NSC) have the authority to make decision on major policies. When deemed necessary, the President may, ex-officio, create an advisory body. For example, the President Advisory Group on Cross-strait Affairs and the National Unification Council (NUC) were created under the Presidential Office to address cross-strait issues. 6.- The “three big links” (da santong) refer to the small three links (xiao santong). Taiwan’s government opened the latter earlier this year. It consists in two frontline island groups of Kinmen and Matsu for direct trade, mail and shipping links with Fujian’s Xiamen, and Mawei port cities. The island of Kinmen is only 10 km from Xiamen harbor in China, while it is 277 km from Taiwan. 7.- The National Unification Council (NUC) consists of representatives from both the government and the private sector, to provide research and advisory opinions on Mainland policy to the President. It is a task force for consulting purposes. In February 1991, then-president and KMT chairman Lee Teng-hui convened the National Unification Council and, in the face of a boycott from the DPP – the then-largest opposition party -drew up the Guidelines for National Unification on the basis of discussions between KMT representatives and a few independents. From their very inception, the guidelines — supposed to be a blueprint for Taiwan’s cross-strait policy — have had problems with their legitimacy and representativeness. They have no legal force nor a political mandate generated by partisan negotiations. Beijing has never paid any attention to them. More recently, pro-reunification groups rediscovered the Guidelines. Rumours have leaked that President would once have made up his mind to abolish the NUC, but has retracted himself and even pledged not to touch upon it after strong warning from Beijing. Beijing seems not to be interested in other formula than the “one China” principle, but on the other hand is attached to the idea of a symbolic NUC in Taiwan. The Presidential power in dealing with the Mainland appears to overpass the MAC – which at least is accountable to the Legislative Yuan. On November 26 2000, the President’s Advisory Group on Cross-Strait Relations reached a consensus called the “three acknowledgments and four suggestions.” That consensus was supposed to be reached in response to Beijing’s “one China” principle. Actually, it appears to have been endorsed only by the so-called anti-reunification camp. The seven-point consensus can be summarized as follows: first, the ROC and the PRC do not represent one another or belong to each other. Secondly, the Taiwan government should handle the PRC’s “one China” stance in accordance with the ROC Constitution. Then, the DPP government should set up a new mechanism or readjust an existing one (such as the National Unification Council) to keep alive the party-to-party mechanisms for inter-party exchange of opinions on cross-strait relations and national development. It is added that building new relations on the basis of the Constitution does not exclude the possibility of future unification between the ROC and the PRC. Reaction to the group’s seven meetings and its conclusions has not been very positive, mainly because of the insufficient political representation within its ranks. To begin with, the KMT and the People First Party refused to join the group. Then the New Party dropped out. Three days after the group’s latest meeting, the DPP’s Central Standing Committee announced its endorsement of the “three acknowledgements, four suggestions” conclusion. The problem is that everybody has a word to say in this matter, but the coordination of the different organisms set up in this regard would be more difficult. The Legislative Yuan itself wants to play a role: in a move to increase its leverage over cross-strait policy the Legislative Yuan released a plan in November 2000 to set up a special task force in the legislature to deal with cross-strait relations. The plan was passed with strong support from opposition lawmakers. Declining to endorse the establishment of such a task force, DPP lawmakers staged a walkout to protest what they said was the legislature’s “infringement on administrative powers.” It was decided that the task force will be convened by the speaker himself. It consists of representatives from all parties based on their representation in the legislature. The KMT will have ten seats; the DPP, six; the People First Party (PFP), three; the New Party, two; the nonpartisan alliance, two; and the independents, one. Under the lawmakers’ plan, the task force will be empowered to convene in cross-strait emergencies and to invite the head of the National Security Council, the premier and ministers to provide briefings. It may also send delegations to visit China. Opposition lawmakers argued that the task force enjoys a much higher level of legitimacy and a greater ability to accommodate the opinions of different political parties than the President’s Advisory Group on Cross-Strait Relations, headed by Academia Sinica President Lee Yuan-tseh. Having seen that, our question is: Who are really in charge of cross-strait relations in Taiwan ? 8.- See Interview with Ms Tsai Ing-wen of MAC on the website 9.- The current Chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) is Wang Daohan. He is said to be in very poor health. He is Koo Chen-foo’ counterpart for cross-strait dialogue. In July 2001, Koo urged Beijing in his speech of the 8th anniversary of the Wang-Koo talks to return to the negotiating table. Koo has officially invited Wang to visit Taiwan and has voiced a desire to visit Shanghai. Spring 2001 | |||
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